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Besides creating new opportunities and improving the lot of many people around the world, 
globalisation and economic integration have also generated economic and social losses. The latter 
are particularly concentrated among the lower and middle classes of advanced industrialised 
countries, who have seen their position worsen primarily as a consequence of shifts in technological 
and geographic production patterns. Meanwhile, the nation state’s capacity to tackle social 
problems such as inequality, poverty and unemployment has been declining as a result of its 
exposure to capital flows, endogenous transformations like ageing, institutional stickiness and 
growing public debt burdens. The populist response to this combination of problems is to reverse 
the process of globalisation and integration, and return to hard national borders. If at all possible, 
such sovereignist recipes would not, however, be an effective solution to the challenges of 
globalisation and integration. While such challenges must be acknowledged, new social policy 
solutions should be devised to improve the lot of the “losers” of  globalisation and integration 
without giving up the many advantages brought about by these processes. We argue that the 
European Union is the appropriate sphere in which to devise such solutions, for it works at a scale 
large enough to preserve the gains from openness while constituting an arena for the legitimate and 
viable creation of new boundaries for market corrections. Based on these premises, we present ideas 
for the development of a European Social Union, structured on five interrelated components: 1) the 
Member States’ national social spaces; 2) the social citizenship space: 3) the transnational social 
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Executive summary  
The rise and expansion of globalisation has generated gains as well as losses. The latter are 
concentrated particularly among the lower and middle classes of developed countries, who find 
themselves in a worse economic and social position due to shifts in geographic and technological 
production patterns, and who are largely unable to take advantage of the opportunities offered by 
the global age. Growing inequality is also accompanied by decreasing social mobility in many 
advanced industrialised countries. 
The subprime crisis and the euro crisis have exacerbated many of the long-term, structural socio-
economic changes brought about by globalisation. This is especially true of the euro crisis, and in 
particular in the periphery of the Eurozone—most notably Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain— 
where the scenario has degraded in terms of inequality, poverty and unemployment.  
Meanwhile, the nation state’s capacity to mitigate the adverse effects of globalisation and the Great 
Recession by means of social policies and other market correcting measures has declined for a 
number of reasons, e.g. exposure to capital flows (which makes it harder for states to impose 
policies affecting returns on capital); endogenous transformations such as ageing; the stickiness of 
existing policies and institutions; many countries’ public debt burden. This (partial) retreat of the 
state is particularly marked within the Eurozone, where state action is constrained by the 
macroeconomic rules of the European Monetary Union.   
Not surprisingly, the social and economic effects of globalisation, integration and, more recently, 
the crisis have caused a backlash against openness in many advanced economies. This has, in turn, 
fuelled an unprecedented wave of populism and Euroscepticism, and the growth of old and new 
sovereignist parties. The latter propose a return to hard borders and the regaining of full national 
control over the flows of goods, capital and people as a solution to the challenges generated by 
globalisation and economic integration.  
This paper argues that the sovereignist agenda—if at all viable—would not be an effective solution 
to the problems of globalisation and integration. At the same time, these problems must be 
acknowledged, and new forms of social intervention—and more generally, market corrections—
should be devised to assist the “losers” of globalisation and integration while retaining the 
advantages generated by these processes.  
The European Union is an ideal arena for the development of these new measures as it provides a 
scale large enough to preserve the advantages of openness but at the same time an arena in which 
the creation of new boundaries for the structuring of social policy would be both viable and 
legitimate. This normative premise is supported by recent survey data, which depict a European 
population not only generally favourable to the EU, but also supportive of the development of the 
European integration project in a more solidaristic direction. 
Based on these observations, this paper presents a number of ideas for the conceptualisation and 
construction of a European Social Union. The latter is composed of five interrelated parts, for which 
we provide an analysis as well as some ideas for further development.  
(1) National Social Spaces. This is the ensemble of social protection systems of the EU Member 
States, resting on the common traditions of “social market economy” and “social dialogue”. The EU 
should intervene in these spaces for several reasons: first, to favour the search for joint solutions to 
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the common problems that Member States confront as a result of the endogenous and exogenous 
transformations illustrated above. Second, to supply resources and incentives to help overcome 
national policy lock-ins and path dependencies. Third, to limit the unbridled system competition 
based on the logic of (social) comparative advantages, which may lead to suboptimal and inefficient 
mutual adjustments, generating a growing “dualisation” between core and periphery. 
The EU can and should be particularly proactive on one front: promoting a reorientation of national 
spaces towards social investment. As argued by a rich literature, social investments (and in 
particular the enhancement of human capital) are a real policy imperative if Europe as a whole 
wishes to reconcile economic competiveness and high prosperity/wellbeing in the context of 
increasing globalisation.  
(2) The EU’s Mobility Space. This is the novel membership space—coterminous with the EU 
external borders—inside which all the bearers of EU citizenship enjoy a common “title” bestowed 
upon them by the Union in order to access the benefits and services of the place in which they 
freely choose to settle and work.  
While the freedom of movement is and must remain a core principle of the Single Market, the fact 
of political conflicts about free movement cannot be ignored. A new balance between openness and 
closure is needed, based on non-dominating conditionality criteria. What might be done is a more 
stringent definition of the rights of those who do not work: e.g. the relatives who remain in the 
countries of origin (for example with regard to family allowances), residents who are not 
economically active, and to some extent also those who move in search of work. Partly, this can be 
done by applying more severely the restrictive clauses that already exist. But one can also imagine 
to introduce legislative changes through the ordinary procedure. A reorientation in this sense is 
already detectable in recent European Court of Justice rulings and doctrine. 
(3) Transnational Social Spaces. This is the ensemble of social schemes and policies characterised 
by a cross-border element. Most of these initiatives involve regions, under the legal umbrella of 
European territorial cooperation. Over the last twenty years, the sub-national level has significantly 
increased its role and importance in many areas of social protection: from health to social services, 
from active labour market policies to inclusion policies. This trend toward a social neo-regionalism 
is partly connected to European integration, which has gradually relaxed the regulative “security 
belts” around nation states and provided incentives and resources for processes of region building, 
largely focused on the territorial differentiation of welfare policies.  
These novel aggregations can promote interesting forms of coordination and even fusion of social 
infrastructures, feed new forms of cross-border solidarity—intermediate between infra-national and 
pan-European solidarity. A similar virtuous circle can result from a second ongoing trend of “social 
transnationalisation”, i.e. the creation of cross-border pension schemes providing supplementary 
benefits to employees working in different member states. 
(4) EU Social Policy. This part indicates the set of supranational policies that have an explicit social 
purpose, be they of a regulative or (re)distributive nature, directly funded by the EU budget (if they 
imply spending) and based on either hard or soft law. 
The big strategic priority of EU social policy should be to give a sharper profile and traction to pan-
European forms of solidarity, calibrating both “reciprocity” and “benevolence”. The most effective 
tool for re-organizing social reciprocity between the member states is some form of risk-pooling. 
The Five President’s Report has already outlined a mutualisation agenda in the banking sector. But 
a more visible and effective innovation would be the establishment of a EU shock absorber scheme 
to co-finance unemployment benefits. Another promising proposal on the risk-pooling front is that 
of promoting the formation of single, pan-European pension insurance schemes at the industry or 
sectoral level, upon the initiative of the social partners. 
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As to benevolence-based solidarity, the most obvious instrument would be a EU scheme of last 
resort assistance, based on the principle of “sufficientarianism”, namely making sure that all EU 
citizens have “enough”, at least enough to survive. 
(5) The European Social Constitution. This is the set of objectives and principles of a social nature 
contained in the Treaties. The agenda of the European social constitution must re-start from Lisbon, 
enabling the full potential of its principles and provisions. The most promising springboard seems 
to be the social clause (Article 9 TFEU). If properly operationalised, the activation of this clause 
might have significant effects in terms of the balance between the economic and social dimension. 
It could in fact serve as a barrier to undue encroachments of the market logic in domestic solidarity 
spaces. And it could act as a tool to monitor and facilitate the effective implementation of the 





The rise and expansion of globalisation is one of the greatest societal changes of our era. Like any 
comparable epochal transformation, globalisation has generated gains as well as losses, which are 
often distributed unevenly among political, economic and social actors. Developing economies, for 
instance, have thrived in the global arena, in many cases helped by transnational corporations which 
are freer than ever to spread their production chains wherever it is most convenient. Consumers in 
rich countries, in turn, can now afford high-end products at prices that were unthinkable only a few 
year ago. Finally, an English speaking cosmopolitan elite has formed worldwide, able to move, live 
and work virtually everywhere.  
The flip side of these gains has been a worsening of the lot of the lower and middle classes in 
advanced economies, who find themselves in a worse economic and social position, mostly due to 
shifts in geographic and technological production patterns, and who are largely unable to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the global age. These are the main losers of globalisation, 
whose situation has further deteriorated due to the recent financial crisis.    
The “great recession” has prompted a number of political and institutional responses, in the first 
place in Europe, to weather the emergency of the crisis. For the most part, however, these fixes 
remain insufficient to tackle the structural challenges of globalisation—and, in Europe, economic 
integration—and to give answers to those left behind by these processes. The losers of globalisation 
and integration are now caught between a national welfare state that is less able to mitigate the 
distributional effects of open markets, and a host of political movements proposing an unrealistic 
return to hard national borders as a panacea for their economic and social distress. Clearly, new and 
inventive institutional solutions will have to be found to make globalisation and integration more 
inclusive, fair, and ultimately politically viable.  
In line with the spirit of the Vision Europe Summit, this paper aims to sketch a number of concrete 
proposals for the transformation of the welfare state in the forthcoming years. In these proposals, as 
well as the analysis on which they build, the focus is primarily (though not exclusively) on the 
European Union. European integration has a two-sided relationship with globalisation: on the one 
hand, the single market reproduces, in regional and expanded form, the social and economic 
openness that defines globalisation. On the other hand, however, the European project includes an 
important politico-institutional level that can serve as the basis for the construction of a more 
effective and multi-level system of welfare, located as it is between the equally unsatisfactory 
national and global arenas.  
The paper is divided in two parts. The first section of Part 1 presents an analysis of the economic 
and social effects of both globalisation and the crisis, focusing particularly on the issues of 
inequality and social mobility. Section 1.2 will then look at the main political and institutional 
consequences of globalisation and integration, namely the state’s decreased ability to mitigate the 
effects of transnational social and economic forces, and the resulting rise of (Eurosceptic) populism. 
Building on these analyses, Part 2 focuses on European integration, its problems and prospects and 
contains some reform proposals. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 present a number of ideas on how to structure 
a novel, regional response to the challenges of globalisation and integration, centred on the notion 
of a European Social Union. Section 2.3 focuses on the possible enhancement of EU (social) 
citizenship and formulates some practical proposals. 
 
PART 1 – GLOBALISATION, INTEGRATION AND THEIR EFFECTS 
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1.1. The decline of North-South inequality, and the rise of inequality in the North 
The changes in the world economy that have occurred over the last three decades can only be 
defined as epochal. As anyone aged 50 or older can testify, the world in the late 1980s, before the 
Berlin Wall came down, and before China started to liberalise its economy and open up to 
international trade, looked very different from the world today. 
In retrospect, the late 1980s were the high point of what economic historians have termed “the great 
divergence”, i.e. the first wave of globalisation set in motion almost two centuries earlier. As 
Britain and other western economies industrialised, and the “age of capital” led to the “age of 
empire” (to recall the titles of Eric Hobsbawm’s celebrated books on the long 19th century), the gap 
in living standards separating the West from the rest of the world began to widen. Around 1820, the 
seven largest advanced economies (United States, Germany, Japan, France, Britain, Canada, and 
Italy), collectively known today as “the G7”, accounted between them for about one fifth of world 
income. By 1990, their share had grown to about two thirds. The first wave of globalisation brought 
unprecedented prosperity to Europe and the other early industrialisers in North America, the South 
Pacific, and Japan. 
The second wave of globalisation was ushered in by the integration into the world economy of 
China, India, Russia, its former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, India, as well as the rise of 
Korea, Taiwan, later Brazil, and other developing economies (such as Vietnam, Thailand, and 
Indonesia). To cite just one set of figures: in 1990, only 3% of world manufacturing was produced 
in China, compared to 65% in the G7; by 2010, China’s share had grown to 19%, while that of the 
G7 had shrunk to 47% (Figure 1.1). A combination of soaring growth in rapidly industrialising 
countries and low growth in the G7 brought about what Richard Baldwin (2016) has called “the 
great convergence”. Over the last quarter of a century, the share of world income earned by the G7 
fell dramatically from two-thirds in 1990 to approximately 40% in 2014 (which happened to be 
about the same as in 1900), as shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
FIGURE 1.1 HERE 
 
FIGURE 1.2 HERE 
 
What are the implications of the current (second) wave of globalisation for global inequality? 
Analytically, global inequality can be thought of as having two components: inequality between 
countries, and inequality within countries. In recent decades, the former has declined while the 
latter has risen. As Branko Milanovic (2016) famously demonstrated, plotting relative gains in real 
per capita incomes by global income level results in an “elephant curve”, shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
FIGURE 1.3 HERE 
 
Between 1988 and 2008, income gains were spectacular (over 80% in real terms) around the 
median of the world income distribution. The persons involved (90% of which lived in China and 
other Asian economies such as India, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia) were the obvious 
beneficiaries of globalisation, and formed the “emerging global middle class”. In contrast, income 
growth was virtually zero around the 80
th
 percentile of the world income distribution. The 
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individuals belonging to that group tended to be in the bottom half of the income distribution of the 
country where they lived, which overwhelmingly coincided with the US, or Japan, or Germany, or 
some other OECD member state. Globalisation has clearly not benefited the “lower middle class in 
the rich world”. On the contrary, the “global plutocracy” saw their incomes soar even higher. The 
incomes of the top 1% of the world distribution grew by over 60% in 1988-2008. 
The advance of the “global plutocracy” (about half of which were US citizens) was even more 
staggering in absolute terms. About 60% of the total gains in real incomes between 1988 and 2008 
were captured by the top 10% of the world income distribution (and 19% of all gains by the top 1% 
alone). 
The global financial crisis has accelerated the “great convergence” further. Turmoil in stock 
exchanges and falling property prices dented to some extent the incomes of the “global plutocracy”, 
while low or no growth in the advanced economies caused the incomes of the “lower middle class 
in the rich world” to stagnate. At the same time, in 2008-2011 average income in urban China 
doubled. 
While China as a whole remained less prosperous than even the poorest member states of the 
European Union, the gap is fast disappearing. Mean incomes (in power purchasing parities) are 
already higher in urban areas of China than in Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania. What is 
more, rising living standards for the middle classes in rapidly industrializing nations have caught up 
with stagnating living standards for low-income families in the Western nations. In 1988, the 
average real income of households in decile 2 (the second poorest) of the US income distribution 
was 6.5 times higher than  that of households in decile 8 (the third richest) of the income 
distribution in urban China. By 2011, that ratio had fallen to 1.3.  
In the meantime, the hyper-wealthy, narrowly defined as comprising the 735 individuals with a net 
wealth of over $2 billion in 2013, did better than ever, their combined assets amounting to over 6% 
of world GDP. Their counterparts back in 1987, the 145 persons with a net wealth of over $1 billion 
(equivalent to $2 billion in 2013 US dollars), had accounted between them for less than 3% of 
global GDP. 
The emergence of a “global plutocracy” is one of the most glaring manifestations of a much broader 
phenomenon: namely, the recent rise of inequality in almost all advanced industrialised countries. 
During the trentes glorieuses, the three decades from the end of World War II to the oil crises 
which destroyed the international economic settlement agreed in Bretton Woods, unprecedented 
economic growth had gone hand in hand with dramatic reductions in income inequality throughout 
the rich world. In the US, inequality had peaked in 1933, at the depth of the Great Depression 
following the Wall Street Crash of 1929, then fell continuously until 1978, when it started to 
increase once again. In Britain, the levelling of the income distribution began earlier (in 1867), and 
came to an end in 1979. While the ascent of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher most sharply 
epitomised the defeat of the Keynesian compromise and the victory of neoliberalism in the US and 
the UK respectively, similar trends can be observed in other Western countries as well. 
What are the causes of rising inequality in the US and Europe? The key facts are well established. 
As successive OECD studies have shown (summarized in OECD 2011), greater labour participation 
as well as greater earnings disparity among male workers accounted for about 60% of the growth of 
inequality in household incomes from the mid-1980s to 2008. Higher labour participation of women 
had the opposite effect, offsetting 19% of the increase in income inequality. Nevertheless, 
“assortative mating” (or the ever greater tendency of women to partner with men of the same 
socioeconomic group), together with changes in family structure (such as the proliferation of single 
person households), explained about 22% of the total rise in inequality. The remaining 40% was the 
unexplained residual. 
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But why has the earnings distribution grown more unequal? For a long time, economists debated 
the respective contributions to inequality of technology vs. globalisation. According to proponents 
of the former, “skill-biased technological change” increased the skills premium, widening the 
distance between the wages of high-skilled workers relative to those of low-skilled ones. More 
recently, David Autor (2014) championed the theory that automation has increased wage 
polarisation: it has rendered redundant and/or compressed the earnings of workers specialised in 
routine tasks, while at the same time raising the demand for both high-skilled jobs at the upper end 
of the earnings scale, and low-skilled non-routine service jobs at the bottom of the distribution. 
Those stressing the role of globalisation point out to the fact that the rise in inequality is associated 
to the disappearance of well-paid jobs in manufacturing in the US and western Europe as firms 
relocated to lower-wage countries, or were driven out of business altogether by lower-priced 
imports from China and other emerging economies. As Milanovic (2016, 109-10) has suggested, 
the two leading contenders for the recent rise in inequality (technology and globalisation) may in 
fact offer complementary explanations: 
[T]he lower price of capital goods leading to the replacement of routine labour and greater 
complementarity between capital and high-skilled workers […] could have occurred only 
under the conditions of globalisation, where reduced prices of capital goods were made 
possible thanks to the existence of cheap labour in China and the rest of Asia. 
Rising income inequality has often been justified in liberal market economies as the price to pay for 
greater equality of opportunity. However, the evidence shows that more inequality is associated 
with less mobility across generations. As Raj Chetty and co-authors (2014) have demonstrated, 
there is in fact far more “opportunity” in egalitarian societies. For instance, the probability of a 
child born to parents in the bottom fifth of the income distribution reaching the top fifth has been 
estimated to be higher in Canada (13.5%) and Denmark (11.7%) than it is in Britain (9.0%) or the 
US (7.5%). 
The relationship between intergenerational earnings persistence and cross-sectional income 
inequality can be depicted graphically in “The Great Gatsby curve”. As Miles Corak (2013) has 
shown (based on the results of various studies on children born in the early to mid-1960s with adult 
outcomes observed in the mid- to late 1990s), the US and the UK are located in the upper right part 
of the curve, suggesting high inequality as well as high earnings persistence (i.e. low mobility). On 
the contrary, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden lie in the bottom left of the curve (Figure 
1.4). 
 
FIGURE 1.4 HERE 
 
Differences in intergenerational mobility were even more pronounced within countries. In the US, 
the chances of children from the poorest 20% of families making it to the top 20% of the income 
distribution were far higher in places like San José, CA (12.9%) than in places like Chicago, IL 
(6.5%) or even worse in Memphis, TN (2.6%). What made children from low-income families in 
high-mobility areas (e.g. San Francisco) differ from those elsewhere was that they were more likely 
to attend college and less likely to experience a teen pregnancy, which points to factors that affect 
children while they are growing up rather than jobs or industrial structure. Chetty et al. (2014) 
found that the strongest correlates of upward intergenerational mobility were low residential 
segregation (and urban sprawl), low income inequality, high school quality, stable families, and 
high social capital. 
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In Europe, a recent study by Eurofound (2017) has highlighted wide differences in relative social 
mobility. The study compared the chances of individuals of differing class origins arriving at 
different class destinations, estimating the extent of social fluidity. (The latter increases if class 
origin becomes a less important factor in experiencing upward mobility or avoiding downward 
mobility.) Using data from the European Social Survey 2002-2010, it estimated that social fluidity 
increased in Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Greece. In contrast, it was 
stable in the UK, Ireland, and Hungary (and for those born since 1946 in Germany, Poland, Spain, 
and the Czech Republic), and declined (for those born in 1965-1975 relative to earlier cohorts) in 
Sweden, France, Austria, Estonia, and Bulgaria (Figure 1.5). 
 
FIGURE 1.5 HERE 
 
1.2. Effects of the great recession and EU-induced austerity in Southern Europe 
On the eve of the Eurozone crisis, average living standards in the southern periphery, adjusted for 
purchasing power, had converged considerably vis-à-vis the rest of western Europe. In 2009, Spain, 
Greece and Portugal had come closer to the EU-15 average than at any time in the previous quarter 
century, though Italy had peaked earlier (in 1995). By 2013, all four countries had lost ground 
relative to the EU-15. Relative living standards fell most dramatically in Greece: to 62% of the EU-
15 average (from 85% in 2009), a level last seen in the early 1960s. More recently, the distance 
seemed to have grown shorter in the case of Portugal and Spain, but not in that of Italy and Greece 
(Figure 1.6). 
 
FIGURE 1.6 HERE 
 
Southern European economies shrank in recent years. Specifically, from peak to trough: Spain by 
8.9% (in 2008-13); Italy by 8.6% (in 2007-13); Portugal by 7.8% (in 2008-13). As for Greece, in 
2007-13 gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 26.5% in real terms. There have been few 
precedents for such a deep and drawn-out recession in the peacetime history of advanced 
economies. The US Great Depression was worse (30% drop in GDP in 1929-32), but it was also 
shorter, and it was followed by a swift recovery largely engineered by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New 
Deal. The trajectory of the Greek economy has so far been L-shaped, not U-shaped: real GDP has 
barely budged (+0.1%) in 2013-16. In contrast, the Spanish economy has grown by a cumulative 
7.9% over the same period, the Portuguese economy by 3.9%, and the Italian economy by 1.8%. 
South European labour markets performed poorly during the crisis. Between 2008 and 2013, the 
number of workers in jobs decreased significantly in all four countries: by 23.5% in Greece, 16.3% 
in Spain, 13.1% in Portugal, 4.2% in Italy. Taking into account changes in the prevalence of part-
time work, Myant et al. (2016) have estimated that between 2007 and 2014 total hours worked by 
employees aged 15-64 fell by 7.5% in Italy, 9.8% in Portugal, 18.6% in Spain and 23.4% in Greece. 
As Figure 1.7 shows, employment rates (even though also affected by the complex interplay of 
demographic changes, including population ageing, fertility, immigration and emigration) have 
fallen precipitously: in Greece by 12.6 percentage points (pp.), in Spain by 9.7 pp., in Portugal by 
7.4 pp., in Italy by 3.1 pp. (in 2008-13). Note that pre-crisis employment rates in southern Europe 
(except Portugal) had been below the EU average. In Greece, the decrease undid the progress of the 
previous two decades. 
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FIGURE 1.7 HERE 
 
In 2007, the unemployment rate in Southern Europe was not far from the average for the EU as a 
whole (7.2%), ranging from 6.1% in Italy to 9.1% in Portugal (with Greece and Spain at 8.4% and 
8.2% respectively). Thereafter, joblessness rose throughout Europe, but nowhere as much as in 
Spain and Greece, where it peaked at a massive 26.1% and 27.5% of the workforce in 2013 
respectively. In 2016, against the EU average of 8.5% (10.0% in the Euro area), unemployment 
stood at 23.6% in Greece, 19.6% in Spain, 11.7% in Italy, and 11.2% in Portugal (Figure 1.8) 
 
FIGURE 1.8 HERE 
 
Real wages experienced zero or negative growth. That was both a result of the recession (i.e. 
reduced demand for labour) and of “internal devaluation” (i.e. policy-driven compression of wages 
via labour market deregulation). A recent study by the European Trade Union Institute (2017), 
based on AMECO data, has estimated that in 2009-16 real wages declined in Greece (by 3.12% per 
year on average), in Portugal (by 0.74% per year), and also in Italy (-0.28%), while they virtually 
stagnated in Spain (+0.13%). 
Wage growth differed by group. As revealed by a study of earnings of private sector employees in 
Greece (IKA 2016), median wages fell by a lot more for newly hired workers (-32.5% in 2009-14) 
and for those aged below 30 (-33.8%) than for workers who remained in employment throughout 
the period (-14.6%), especially if they stayed with the same firm (-5.6%). What this suggests is that 
not only did earnings fall precipitously, but also their distribution became more unequal. 
Eurostat figures indicate that income inequality has gone up throughout southern Europe since 
2009. (In 2007-09, Portugal and, to a lesser degree, Greece had experienced a drop in inequality). 
The growth in inequality over the entire period has been greatest in Spain, the country with the 
highest level in 2014. This was true regardless of the indicator used. Note that the Gini coefficient is 
more sensitive to changes in the middle of the distribution, while the income quintile share ratio 
S80/S20 measures the income share of the richest 20% relative to that of the poorest 20% and is 
hence more sensitive to changes at the two ends of the distribution (Figures 1.9 and 1.10). 
 
FIGURE 1.9 HERE 
 
FIGURE 1.10 HERE 
 
Relative poverty has also gone up, even though changes in relative poverty rates are confounded by 
changes in median incomes and hence in the poverty thresholds. In 2014, the relative poverty rate 
was highest in Spain, having risen since 2013 (i.e. just as the economy began to recover). 
“Anchoring” the poverty threshold to an earlier year is one way of dealing with the confounding 
role of changes in median incomes and poverty thresholds. By this definition, poverty rose 
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significantly in 2009-2013 in all countries (in Greece: from 18.0% to as much as 48.0% of the 2007 
median, adjusted for inflation), as shown in Figure 1.11. 
 
FIGURE 1.11 HERE 
 
As the evidence on inequality and poverty suggests, social stabilisers have failed to offset the 
adverse effects of the economic crisis. In fact, the growth in social expenditure was pro-cyclical. 
Before the crisis began in earnest, social spending continued to rise in real terms. Then, just as the 
recession deepened, spending on social benefits started to fall, as fiscal constraints became more 
binding, and austerity policies targeted social spending. This was just one of the several ways in 
which the crisis has affected the capacity of European states, which are examined in greater depth in 
the following section.    
 
1.3 Globalisation, crisis, and the state 
The economic and social transformations brought about by the era of globalisation have been 
accompanied by changes in the capacity of the nation state to limit and correct for inequalities of 
income and opportunities—and generally protect the more vulnerable parts of its citizenry—
through the tools of the welfare state. Roughly between the end of the second World War and the 
1970s-80s, the (Western) international system was regulated by what John Ruggie (1982) dubbed a 
regime of “embedded liberalism”, namely a mixed economic configuration in which a fairly high 
degree of openness in the area of trade (regulated by such institutions as the general Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade - GATT) was combined with a significant degree of public  intervention within 
state boundaries, aimed at preserving full employment and, generally, social welfare by mitigating 
and circumscribing market dynamics. This compromise between states’ domestic social goals and 
international markets was made possible to a great extent through limits imposed on the 
international flows of capital.  
The advent of globalisation altered the embedded liberalism compromise by expanding the 
functional scope of international free market beyond the confines of the post-WWII regime—
including, importantly, capital flows—and by extending the geographic reach of the liberal 
economic system to a number of new emerging economies, most notably (but not limited to) China. 
Initially, many an analyst of the globalisation phenomenon expected the latter to engender a “race 
to the bottom” effect in many areas of domestic state intervention. Market corrections in such areas 
as taxation, labour market and workplace regulations, social security, etc., the argument went, 
would increase the cost of producing in a given country and incentivise capital to flee, thus leaving 
the country in question with a choice between losing competitiveness, international market share 
and ultimately growth, or conforming to a capital-friendly, laissez-faire model of political economy. 
The world depicted by early globalisation scholars, in short, was one in which transnational forces 
and networks, above all economic ones, greatly gained power at the expense of the traditional 
nation state, which would find itself in retreat (Strange 1996), and unable to impose its will and 
sovereignty in many areas, including welfare policies (Alesina and Perotti 1994). 
Later research has amended those pessimistic conclusions. By looking at a range of empirical 
evidence, a number of scholars have found that the effects of globalisation on state domestic 
(social) capacity cannot be reduced to an across-the-board race to the bottom, but are instead varied 
and mediated by factors like, to mention a few, the state’s position in the international economy 
(Garretsen and Peeters 2007), the structure of its industrial-productive system (Chen et al. 2014), 
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and the specific type of state intervention under exam (for instance, regulation on productive 
processes are more constrained than those on products, and taxation is easier on mobile than on 
immobile factors) (Scharpf, Rhodes and Evans 1998). 
On the whole, then, it can be argued that while globalisation has not generated the neoliberal 
convergence that many feared (and others hoped for), it has undoubtedly affected the nation state in 
its freedom to set and capacity to implement its domestic social goals. This is particularly true in all 
those cases in which state intervention impacts on the return on mobile capital, either indirectly, for 
instance through regulations affecting production costs, or directly through taxation. Figure 1.12 
shows this latter mechanism at play by graphing the temporal trend in effective taxation of 
corporate income in a selection of 14 European countries. As the graph shows, in virtually all of 
them taxation moved downwards starting around the mid-1980s, in correspondence with an increase 
in international economic integration in the form of not only globalisation but also the European 
Single Market. Needless to say, lower capital taxation reduces the resources that the state can 
command to pursue its domestic goals. 
 
FIGURE 1.12 HERE 
 
As its ability to buffer the effects of globalisation is reduced by its very exposure to transnational 
economic and financial flows, the state also faces another set of challenges coming from 
technological change, and more precisely automation and digitalisation, two trends connected to yet 
distinct from globalisation. The socio-economic effects of technological change are multiple but, 
similarly to globalisation, the most prominent ones are the (at least short-term) disruption of old 
patterns of production and related job markets, and an increase in economic disparities, as new 
technologies improve the opportunities of the highly skilled workers (and high-end consumers) able 
to take advantage of them, while they worsen the lot of workers with lower skills such as those 
employed in routine jobs that can be automated (Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou 2013; 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). At the same time, digitalisation generates new markets and jobs at 
the lower end of the service spectrum (e.g. the sharing economy), which are often highly precarious 
in nature and not sufficiently covered by the traditional welfare protections tailored around the 
needs of mass industrialised economies (Colin and Palier 2015). 
To be sure, the state’s diminished ability to tackle the adverse effects of both globalisation and 
technological change are not exhausted by its reduced control on cross-border financial flows. At 
least two additional factors are at play: the first is institutional stickiness, and in particular the 
entrenchment of many existing social policy instruments by virtue of constellations of beneficiaries, 
bureaucracies and other constituencies in their support (Pierson 1993). Institutional stickiness 
constitutes an obstacle to state action in responding to new social challenges whenever such action 
requires the partial or total dismantling of existing measures (for instance when limited resources 
need to be reallocated from an old to a new welfare programme). The second factor at play in many, 
though not all, western democracies is the size of their public debt, which limits their range of 
social policy intervention whenever the latter comes at the cost of greater public outlays. (Needless 
to say, this constraint is particularly rigid for those countries with a high level of taxation, leaving 
very little wiggle room on that side as well—Italy is a case in point). Figure 1.13 provides a visual 
overview of this type of constraint on state action by showing the current level of public debt as a 
percentage of gross domestic product in European Union members. 
 
FIGURE 1.13 HERE 
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In recent years, the long-term and structural effects of globalisation described in the foregoing have 
been compounded by the dynamics and effects of the US subprime crisis and the ensuing Eurozone 
crisis. Considered as a whole, the “great recession” is linked to the broader phenomenon of 
globalisation in three ways: in the first place, the crisis can be interpreted as a result of the fast 
expansion of finance capital that has characterised globalisation, and which has made economic 
systems around the world particularly exposed to bubbles and bursts. In this respect, the great 
recession can be seen as the ultimate product of the “dark side” of globalisation (e.g. Rodrik 2017). 
In the second place, and connected to the above, the way in which the crisis has spread from the 
United States to Europe and the rest of the world is a clear manifestation of the effects of the 
transnational economic and financial linkages and interdependence that contribute to defining 
globalisation. Finally, as already mentioned, the great recession has exacerbated some of the 
economic, social, and political effects of globalisation, while also adding a number of new 
challenges of its own. Among the former are, for instance, an increase in overall economic 
inequality, as shown in the previous section. Among the latter is a short-term rise in unemployment 
and poverty, two phenomena which have been, at least in Europe, particularly severe among the 
younger generations, as shown in Figure 1.14.  
 
FIGURE 1.14 HERE 
 
In a similar vein, the crisis has affected the intervention capacity of the state in a way that has added 
to and exacerbated trends already at play in the long run. This is especially true of the Eurozone, 
and in particular of its peripheral members, whose economic downturn has been detailed in the 
previous section. As the two figures below show, automatic stabilisers built in the welfare systems 
of the EU’s southern states determined an increase in social spending at the outset of the crisis. 
However, shortly afterwards, and more importantly during the worst part of the euro crisis, public 
spending became pro-cyclical in all four countries shown in the graphs (with a particularly dramatic 
reduction in Greece), due in large part to the introduction of austerity policies, which in turn were 
ingrained in the fiscal architecture of the European (Monetary) Union, as defined by the Stability 
and Growth Pact (reinforced during the crisis through the so-called Two-Pack and Six-Pack) and 
the Fiscal Compact. By Eurostat figures, social expenditure per capita fell by 3% in real terms in 
Italy (in 2010-13), by 5% in Portugal (2010-12), by 6% in Spain (in 2009-14), and by as much as 




FIGURE 1.15 HERE 
 
FIGURE 1.16 HERE 
 
                                                          
1
 Of course, not all parts of these aggregate figures have moved in the same way. Pension expenditures, for instance, 
have remained stable in Italy, and increased in Spain and Portugal, as a result of population ageing.  
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To sum up, what the foregoing analysis depicts is a situation in which the nation state, particularly 
in Europe, has seen a reduction in its capacity to redress some of the adverse effects of globalisation 
and the crisis on its lower and middle classes—the losers of globalisation—due to a number of 
external constraints (in addition to endogenous transformations such as the ageing of its 
population). Foremost among these constraints are the state’s exposure to transnational economic 
and financial flows and, in the EU case, the set of supranational rules constraining autonomous state 
action—in the first place the monetary and fiscal straightjackets imposed by the Eurozone setup.  
The picture is further complicated by two factors. The first is the international movement of 
people—one of the defining features of globalisation—which is particularly important within the 
EU, where free movement is part and parcel of the single market. Migration flows in turn 
exacerbate the above picture in two ways: first, by further undermining the economic position of the 
host countries’ lower and middle classes, with whom immigrants compete in the job market. 
Second, by feeding the often misplaced but widespread perception of immigrants as underserving 
net recipients of welfare measures, thus further strengthening the image of the host state as unable 
to shield its nationals from the detrimental effects of the international economy. Add to this the 
readiness with which the state, especially in Europe, has been seen to open its coffers to bail out 
failing financial institutions—the second factor—and what results is a very fertile social context for 
the emergence of political movements and entrepreneurs pointing their finger at globalisation and 
integration as the true culprits for the misfortunes of their fellow nationals.  
Faced with worsened economic conditions and with a state whose ability to respond to their needs 
has diminished over time, those sectors of the population that have lost ground as a result of 
globalisation and integration have unsurprisingly turned against these two processes—seen as the 
root causes of their difficulties—and the political and economic elites that over time have promoted 
and gained from openness. Given the analysis presented in the first section of this paper, it should 
come as no surprise that opinion against economic openness is distributed unevenly from one 
country to the next. Figure 1.17 summarises the result of an October 2016 survey conducted by 
YouGov in 19 developed and developing countries.  
 
FIGURE 1.17 HERE 
 
While globalisation is seen as a “force for good” by a majority of respondents in all countries 
surveyed—with the notable exception of France—opinion on globalisation is, on average, more 
positive in the developing world than it is in more advanced economies. This distribution is 
consistent with the economic analysis presented above, which has shown how developing countries 
have gained more, relatively speaking, from globalisation, and that economic gains in developed 
countries have been rather unevenly distributed, leading a good portion of the western populations 
to perceive globalisation mostly in terms of damaging and unfair competition from poorer regions 
(Rodrik 2017). The relationship between international economic position and opinion on 
globalisation is shown more clearly in Figure 1.18, which plots opinion against per capita GDP 
variation in the period 2011-15.   
 
FIGURE 1.18 HERE 
 
A similar distribution of public opinion can be observed regarding the human side of globalisation, 
represented by migration flows. Roughly speaking, immigration can be opposed by globalisation 
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discontents on two distinct grounds. The first is economic, and can be summarised by the two 
mechanisms explained above, namely the “job market competition” mechanism and the “welfare 
crowding out” mechanism. The second ground is cultural and relates to immigrants being perceived 
as threatening the host country’s customs and culture. Clearly, the two are related, as the more 
culturally different immigrants are compared to the host population, the more likely their presence 
will be perceived as economically hostile. The chart below shows overall opinion on immigration in 
the 19 countries surveyed by YouGov. While differences between developed and developing 
countries are not as clear-cut as in the previous case, here too the overall pattern seems to be that 
immigration is seen less favourably in advanced economies than in poorer ones.  
 
FIGURE 1.19 HERE 
 
Switching the focus on Europe, in the past decade or so general public opinion trends against 
openness and transnationalism have had a regional counterpart in the marked decline of trust in the 
European Union institutions among member states’ populations, as shown in Figure 1.20.   
 
FIGURE 1.20 HERE 
 
To be sure, we are not suggesting that the two phenomena—opposition to globalisation and to 
European integration—are one and the same. Distinctions between the two should be made clear: in 
the first place, as already mentioned above while the decline in trust vis-à-vis the EU is to be 
attributed primarily to the dynamics and effects of the recent euro crisis, opposition to globalisation 
is a more mixed phenomenon, which has been certainly boosted by the great recession but includes 
an important long-term and structural component. It should also be noted here that European 
integration and globalisation are in a number of ways conflicting phenomena. The European Union, 
for instance, has often been among the staunchest critics of some of the excesses of globalisation, 
whether out of principle or interest: the EU’s battle against genetically modified organisms is a case 
in point. Therefore, generally speaking we should not necessarily expect opinion on the EU and on 
globalisation to move together.  
Nevertheless, the two phenomena converge in an important respect, which is very relevant today, 
namely in their being two distinct manifestations of a more general revolt against transnationalism 
and supranationalism—and the politico-economic elites promoting them—based on the conviction 
that re-establishing hard borders and renationalising powers would benefit national communities by 
giving them back the policy-making tools and capacities that have been lost in recent decades. 
Given this convergence, it is not surprising that both criticism towards globalisation and 
Euroscepticism have contributed to the exceptional rise of populist political forces, on the left and 
especially on the right, that western democracies have witnessed in recent years. 
Looking at Europe, in recent years populism has grown in member states of different size, political 
system and traditions, and economic position. In some cases Eurosceptic grievances have been 
channelled by previously existing parties which have received a boost by the crisis, such as the 
Northern League in Italy, the Front National in France, the FPO in Austria and the UK 
Independence Party in Britain. In other cases new movements have emerged to capture the support 
and votes of those dissatisfied with the existing party landscape. This is the case, for instance, with 
Italy’s Five Star Movement, Greece’s Syriza, and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland. Whether 
closer to the left or the right of the traditional political spectrum, populist parties share a critical 
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view of integration as an elite-driven process that benefits the few at the expense of the many—“the 
people”—whose welfare and life chances are threatened by unemployment, immigration, and a 
dwindling welfare state. To this, populism responds by promoting a nationalist agenda, which 
promises to take back control from the delegitimised technocratic elites in their capitals and 
Brussels, and right the wrongs of globalisation and integration.  
Figure 1.21 shows an overall snapshot of the electoral growth of Europe’s populist movements by 
comparing results of the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections in terms of EP seats. As the 
figure shows, all the three groups that can be said to have at least a populist and/or Eurosceptic 





FIGURE 1.21 HERE 
 
Box 1.1 - Case study: Brexit  
While Eurosceptic populism has grown virtually everywhere in Europe in the past decade or so, so 
far only in one instance has its agenda managed to become majoritarian, namely in the so-called 
Brexit referendum. Held on 23 June 2016, the referendum on Britain’s exit from the European 
Union resulted from a 2015 electoral promise by incumbent Prime Minister David Cameron who 
vowed, in case of a Tory victory in the upcoming general elections, to renegotiate the UK’s EU 
membership terms and then ask his fellow citizens to vote on the latter. Cameron was in turn 
reacting to a rising tide of Euroscepticism in Britain—a country already traditionally tepid vis-à-vis 
the EU—as a result of the euro crisis, and especially to the ever stronger competition of Nigel 
Farage’s UK Independence Party for the country’s centre-right vote.  
After the 2015 Tory victory, the Cameron cabinet launched a rapid round of negotiations with the 
remaining EU member states, obtaining a few concessions (most notably in the area of welfare for 
EU-immigrants), on the basis of which Cameron himself supported the Remain campaign in the 
upcoming Brexit referendum. However, the strength of the Eurosceptic sentiment in the country—
which the government had clearly underestimated—combined with a split within the Tories 
themselves between Leavers and Remainers and, finally a blatant asymmetry in the campaigning 
and communication abilities of the two sides, eventually led Cameron and the Remain side to lose 
the referendum 48% to 52%, leaving many in the UK and elsewhere dumbstruck, and inaugurating 
the first member state withdrawal process in the history of the Union.  
While negotiations between the UK and the remaining 27 EU members on the terms of the 
separation are still ongoing, and will last at least until the spring of 2019, it is already possible to 
draw some conclusions about the nature of the Brexit process and the main factors behind it. 
Building on the results of an original survey run in the autumn of 2016, and cross-referencing this 
information with secondary economic and demographic data, the research project REScEU 
(Reconciling Economic and Social Europe) and its observatory EuVisions (www.euvisions.eu) have 
been able to reach a number of conclusions on Brexit. Among these is, first, that the Leave victory 
was driven primarily by the so-called welfare chauvinism, i.e. a negative view of immigrants 
perceived as undeserving recipients of social spending. Second, this welfare chauvinism was, in 
                                                          
2
 The figure does not include the Europe of Nations and Freedom group, which was formed in 2015 by a number of 
extreme right populist parties, incuding the Front National, the Northern League and the FPO.  
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turn, mostly motivated by economic rather than cultural reasons, as its effect on voting behaviour 
was stronger in those areas that have experienced higher rates of unemployment in recent years. 
Finally, and importantly for the current negotiations, welfare chauvinism continues to have an 
important effect after the referendum, affecting preferences for a “hard Brexit”—a scenario in 
which the UK will leave all EU arrangement, including the single market—over a soft one 
(Pellegata 2017). Taken together, this data confirms the above depiction of Eurosceptic support as 
the reaction of some parts of the electorates that feel short-changed by economic openness and 
integration.    
 
1.4  The emergence of a new cleavage?  
Taking the analysis to a higher level of abstraction, some scholars have interpreted the rise of 
populist and Eurosceptic parties as the symptom of a broader and deeper transformation in the 
western societies, that is the emergence of a new fundamental cleavage structuring social conflict 
and political competition along the integration-demarcation divide (Kriesi et al. 2006; 2012; 
Hooghe and Marks 2017). Building on Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s (1967) classic cleavage 
theory, this argument sees the process of globalisation, integration and finally the crisis as historical 
critical junctures comparable to the formation of the modern nation state and the advent of 
industrialisation. Just as the latter congealed the cleavages that have dominated political 
competition since—centre vs periphery, state vs church, land vs industry, and capital vs labour—the 
forces of globalisation and integration have engendered, in recent years, a new dimension of 
conflict that pits the actors and forces supporting countries’ international openness and 
multilateralism against those opposed to them. 
The emergence of the new integration-demarcation divide is accompanied by a partial realignment 
of voter preferences in western democracies, whereby mainstream parties (mostly ordered along 
one or more of the four traditional cleavages) see parts of their traditional electorates, and more 
generally supporting social blocs, shift towards new and old movements located on the demarcation 
side of the new cleavage. So far such a realignment has affected particularly the mainstream left, 
which has seen chunks of its working class electorate move towards (often right-wing) populist 
parties, as the latter are perceived as more effective defenders of their voters’ interests against 
transnational pressures and welfare state erosion (Swank and Betz 2003; Oesch 2008).  
Shifting the focus from the dynamics of political competition to those of public policy, however, it 
is quite clear that neither side of the integration-demarcation cleavage has a satisfactory answer to 
the socioeconomic problems generated by globalisation and integration. On the one hand, a return 
to hard national borders—assuming that such a return is realistic at all: witness the many 
complications of the Brexit process—is likely to create more problems than it solves, both in the 
short and in the long run. On the other hand, globalisation as the mere transcendence of boundaries, 
to put it like Bartolini (2005), is of no more help, because by definition it has no answer to the need 
for correction of transnational market forces, and in any case takes place at a geographic scale that 
is too vast for such a correction to function in an effective as well as democratic fashion.  
The response, thus, is most likely to be found at an intermediate, regional level: one that is wide 
enough to safeguard the many benefits that the transnational flows of goods, capitals, and people 
bring about, but at the same time small enough for the establishment of new correcting policy 
tools—and ultimately the drawing of new social boundaries demarcating the application of such 
tools (Ferrera 2005)—to be both realistic and justifiable. Needless to say, the European Union, with 
its history of cooperation and established supranational structures, is an ideal ground for the 
structuring of innovative solutions to the shortcomings of globalisation and integration. 
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PART 2 - THE EU’S PREDICAMENT: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND SOLUTIONS 
 
2.1 A new conflict constellation 
During the euro crisis EU politics has witness the emergence (or exacerbation) of four distinct lines 
of conflict. The first revolves around the policy priorities and overall mission of EMU and pits the 
supporters of a neo-liberal project, centred on market making and monetary/ fiscal stability against 
a growth/employment oriented project, supported by public investments and accompanied by a 
stronger social dimension. This divide does not question integration as such, but rests on different 
visions and programmatic ideas about  EMU’s finalité. It has long been debated whether EU 
politics (as distinct from domestic politics) can be captured in terms of Left and Right (Kriesi et al., 
2012). The crisis has definitely increased the visibility and salience of this traditional dimension: 
within the intellectual and political circles that remain loyal to the European cause, a “euro-liberal” 
and a “euro-social” view have become clearly recognizable, in supranational as well as national 
arenas. Such views were explicitly articulated during the 2014 EP election, both in the platforms of 
mainstream European parties and in the public debates between the Spitzenkandidaten  (Hobolt, 
2014). This is a significant break with the past. The classic dimension of twentieth-century political 
competition has begun to openly Europeanize within electoral arenas, originating ideological 
divides about the integration process -rooted in material interests and normative orientations- as 
well as power conflicts among leaders pursuing consensus and change. 
The second line of conflict has to do with the issue of fiscal stability and, ultimately, cross national 
transfers. The major divide here sets core against peripheral member states, is rooted in both 
economic interests and highly entrenched cultural worldviews and mainly runs from North to 
South. It is true that on this front the Eastern member states tend to side with the North. But only a 
few of them belong to the Eurozone; moreover, these countries are net recipients of the EU budget, 
thus do not have a strong interest in opposing cross-national redistributions.  
Creditor member states (Germany in primis) support a markedly disciplinarian approach according 
to which domestic fiscal imbalances reflect bad policy choices in the past; thus the burdens of 
adjustment should fall on national governments (the “homework” approach) and taxpayers. 
“Domestic decisions imply domestic liability”, “collective liability only with collective control”: 
these two maxims (clearly rooted in Ordoliberal doctrines) have been repeated several times by 
German (Dutch, Finnish) leaders in the course of the crisis (Dyson, 2014).  
While initially accepting fiscal discipline and conditionality and signing the Fiscal Compact, debtor 
countries have started to voice against EMU’s austerian stance and to ask for greater flexibility in 
the application of rules, the mobilization of EU resources for investments and growth and –last but 
not least- the mutualisation of risks. As is well known, the creditor-debtor conflict exploded during 
the first Greek bailout in 2010, which imposed severe measures of labour market deregulation and 
welfare retrenchment. The conditionality regime promoted by creditor countries provoked a social 
shock and caused overt and heated waves of protest, emblematically represented by the rise of 
Syriza. Conversely, in Germany the widespread aversion to a Transfer Union (supposedly) funded 
by German taxpayers paved the way for the emergence of Eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland. 
While the divide between euro-liberals and euro-socials has prompted a timid, but visible 
Europeanisation of the Left-Right dimension, the novel divide between core and periphery has 
instead generated a burst of centrifugation, which is squandering the laboriously accumulated 
capital of respect, trust, and mutual sympathy among EU governments, and especially among 
citizens of different nationalities ‒ a worrying trend of de-Europeanisation. 
 20 
The third line of conflict has to do with the integration/demarcation divide mentioned above and 
thus with issues related to free movement, solidarity vis-à-vis outsiders and, more specifically, 
access to domestic welfare on the side of other EU nationals. Such issues started to be politicised 
after the 2004 Eastern enlargement. Initially, contention focused on freedom of service (consider 
the notorious “Polish plumber” controversy and later the wide mobilisation around the Bolkestein 
directive) but then it extended to the intra-EU mobility of workers (including rules on “posting” 
from one member state to another), setting the supporters of pan-European free movement and non-
discrimination, on the one hand, against supporters of social and cultural closure on the other.  
This line of conflict has a recognizable geographic dimension, running from East to West. In the 
wake of rising inflows from the newly acceded member states, the public opinions of the receiving 
countries have developed increasing hostility against immigrants, accused of “benefit tourism” and 
held responsible for social dumping dynamics in terms of jobs and wages. Both reflecting and 
reinforcing such orientations, parties with a restrictive and protectionist (or better, nativist: Mudde, 
2007) agenda (typically right-wing populist parties) have become more and more attractive. The 
refugee crisis of 2015 has served as a further multiplier, triggering off chauvinist attitudes and 
protectionist measures (including physical “walls”) also in Central and Eastern Europe. The most 
emblematic and at the same time dramatic effect of anti-immigrant politics (fomented by the 
economic crisis) is of course the British case, illustrated above. 
Finally, the fourth line of conflict concerns the “powers of Brussels” vis-à-vis the defence of 
domestic models and practices, especially in the social sphere. The opposition between 
supranational centralisation and national sovereignty, more vs less integration has long been a 
salient and constitutive dimension of the EU political space (Grande and Hutter, 2016), pitting euro-
lukewarm Northern (and Eastern) member states against euro-enthusiast Continental and Southern 
ones. Anti-integration sentiments have massively grown in recent years, also in the second group, 
where EU support has dramatically plummeted during the crisis. Eurosceptic formations have taken 
root almost everywhere (Mudde, 2013; Kriesi and Pappas, 2016), increasing in strength and impact 
(Brexit, again). In addition to the theme of immigration and, more generally, of ''opening", 
Eurosceptic parties point the finger at the excessive bureaucracy and technocratic nature of 
Brussels’s decisions, calling for a return to "peoples’ self-determination". In some cases (e.g., the 
Northern League in Italy), the peoples in question are sub-national communities.  
Compared to the other three lines of conflict, the vertical tension between Brussels and national 
governments is more difficult to capture in a pure form. It generally tends, in fact, to be referred to 
some specific policy, or to cross-cutting issues: austerity, the euro, the cost of membership, 
migration, the democratic deficit. Bashing Brussels and re-emphasising the value of national 
autonomy (or otherwise stated: subsuming policy-related grievances under the wider constitutive 
issues of cultural identity and national sovereignty) becomes the default option. i.e. the easier and 
simpler way to politicise issues linked to the socio-economic dimension along the North-South or 
East-West axis. Even the question of the EU mission as such (first line of conflict) can be shifted 
from the horizontal, Left-Right dimension, into the vertical dimension: leave our welfare state 
alone, the EU must not intrude (e.g. in the Nordic countries); you keep your social standards, we 
keep our jobs (the famous phrase by John Major, when he refused to sign the Maastricht Social 
Protocol); down with the euro and the European Central Bank, let us return to our national 
currencies (e.g. in France or Italy). These inter-dimensional shifts tend to occur in many federal 
systems. But in a still imperfect and incomplete polity such as the EU, the syndrome has extremely 
destabilising consequences. 
As was the case in the development of national welfare states during the 20th century, the 
politicisation of solidarity essentially revolves around three foundational questions: who questions 
(who are “we”, i.e. issues of identity and inclusion/exclusion); what questions (how much 
redistribution within and across the “we” collectivities) and who decides questions (the locus of 
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authority that can produce and guarantee social entitlements) (Ferrera, 2005; Statham and Trenz, 
2013). Historically, such questions were prompted by the socially disruptive impacts of market 
expansion. But policy answers were shaped by a mix of economic interests, cultural identities and 
normative orientations, within specific national political and institutional contexts. Social 
reformism tended to proceed in an incremental fashion through constant puzzling (ideas) and 
powering (consensus building). Its trajectory was however punctuated by a number of critical 
junctures (e.g. the years that followed World War II) during which ambitious intellectual visions 
and blueprints combined with a political interest – broadly understood – in reconfiguring an 
untenable status quo.  
After the Great Recession, the EU finds itself at a new critical juncture. Bold reform proposals are 
badly needed. Especially after Brexit, however, a pessimistic mood has been taking root, taking it 
for granted that public opinion constraints against integration have become so high that only 
marginal changes are possible. As Wolfgang Schauble said in a recent interview: this is no time for 
visions. But are we sure that EU citizens are so averted to change and more integration?  
 
2.2 Public opinion after the crisis: some encouraging trends 
Acknowledging the emergence of a new conflict constellation during the crisis should not 
necessarily lead to despair about the future of transnationalism and supranationalism in Europe. 
Some reasons for cautious optimism have emerged lately. In the first place, and very simply, the 
performance of EU and Eurozone economies is back to positive (Figure 2.1). At least in the short 
run, this is good news for the popularity of the European Union project.  
 
FIGURE 2.1 HERE 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, there are some signs that public opinion is, albeit slowly, moving 
away from populism. One such sign was the June 2017 election of Europhile Emmanuel Macron as 
French president, in a run-off against Eurosceptic champion and Front National leader Marine Le 
Pen. More generally, while Euroscepticism remains a strong and vocal force in the continent, 
European public opinion is likely to be better disposed towards the integration project than is often 
thought. This is especially true if the EU is not taken as a static phenomenon, to be accepted or 
rejected as is, but rather as a dynamic entity that can developed in a more socially friendly direction.   
For instance, a recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre (2017) in ten EU member 
states—France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the 
UK—shows that, while Europeans are on the whole still critical of the way the Union is run (e.g. a 
lot of criticism is directed at the way Brussels has responded to the euro and refugee crises), they 
remain supportive of their countries’ EU membership, which they prefer over exit scenarios. 
Interestingly, positive views of the EU are particular high among the younger generations.   
The above results support the conclusions of another, more specific survey conducted by the 
REScEU project in the fall of 2016 in seven European countries: Greece, France, Italy, Sweden, 
Spain, Poland, and the UK (Ferrera and Pellegata 2017). Unlike similar existing studies, the 
REScEU survey combined general attitudinal questions concerning the Union to a number of more 
specific questions aimed at gauging opinion on the solidarity dimension of the EU, and on the latter 
as a social policy actor. Some of the REScEU survey results are worth reporting here (for more 
information, see the Appendix).  
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In the first place, the survey asked respondents in six countries (all except the UK) their position on 
a hypothetical referendum on their country’s exit from the EU, along the lines of the Brexit 
referendum. As Figure 2.2 shows, in all countries the “remain” option enjoys a comfortable 
majority, being chosen by a minimum of 57% of the respondents (in France and Sweden).  
 
FIGURE 2.2 HERE 
 
Next, the survey asked respondents to apply one of four metaphors to the European Union often 
used by the media and commentators, ranked from the more optimistic to the most pessimistic and 
Eurosceptic one: a “common house”, an “apartment building” (in which national peoples are good 
neighbours), a “playground” for mutually beneficial exchanges among member states, and finally a 
“sinking ship” from which member states should escape. As the figure below shows, the apartment 




FIGURE 2.3 HERE 
 
 
Digging deeper, REScEU researchers asked respondents whether the relationship between EU 
member states should be one characterised by international economic solidarity, or conversely one 
of self-help and national responsibility. As Figure 2.4 shows, with varying degrees, in all surveyed 
countries the vast majority of respondents support some form of interstate solidarity, whether 
subject to precise conditions (the current status quo) or more generously, such as through soft loans 
or even unconditional transfers.  
 
FIGURE 2.4 HERE 
 
A further step for the social development of the European Union would be for it to have a larger 
role in the provision of welfare measures directed at individuals and families rather than states and 
regions. The survey explored this aspect through a battery of questions on whether the EU should 
introduce policy instruments to guarantee, respectively, means of subsistence for citizens in case of 
a crisis (Figure 2.5), poverty relief (Figure 2.6), or insurance against unemployment (Figure 2.7). 
Results in all these cases are even more in favour of solidaristic scenarios, confirming a good 
disposition among Europeans vis-à-vis the notion of a more social Europe. 
 
FIGURE 2.5 HERE 
 
FIGURE 2.6 HERE 
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FIGURE 2.7 HERE 
 
Finally, REScEU researchers asked respondents for their opinion on whether immigrants from other 
EU member states should be granted the same level of welfare protection as host country citizens, 
or instead some restrictions and limitations should be introduced. As shown in Figure 2.8, almost 
half of the respondents would grant unrestricted welfare to all EU immigrants, regardless of their 
work status, while an additional 20% would grant it to all workers from other EU countries. Only 
30% would give priority to national workers over foreign ones.   
 
FIGURE 2.8 HERE 
 
Taken as a whole, the data just presented depicts a more optimistic situation than one could 
extrapolate from the recent surge of the populist right in Europe; one in which European citizens are 
quite open (perhaps more so than their political leaders) to the idea of the European Union stepping 
up its efforts in the area of social policy and solidarity more in general. This, in turn, is consistent 
with the idea sketched at the end of the previous section, of the Union as the locus of a renewal of 
the continent’s welfare state, which recognises the need to correct some of the adverse effects of 
globalisation and economic integration while acknowledging that the nation state can no longer be 
the only scale at which such corrections take place. 
To be sure, social Europe is not the national welfare state writ large. The European Union lacks the 
history, structures, and legitimacy to sustain something akin to the welfare state as we know it, at 
least for the foreseeable future. A more realistic scenario is one in which a European system of 
social protection is built on a variety of levels—supranational, national, local—and instruments, 
reflecting the peculiarities and multi-layered nature of the Union as a political construction. The 
next section describes the contours of this scenario in greater detail.  
 
2.3 Towards a European Social Union 
Since the Single European Act of 1987, “social Europe” has been the holy grail for progressive 
reformers. Alas, it has also become one of the most elusive concepts in both EU studies and 
political debates about the integration process. Ambiguity stems from the tension between the 
horizontal connotation of the concept—solidaristic goals, policies and achievements at the national 
level: what the French debate calls le social dans l’Europe—and its vertical connotation, i.e. 
solidaristic or at least socially friendly goals, policies and achievements at the supranational 
level—l’Europe dans le social (Chassard and Venturini 1995). Instead of ignoring this tension and 
surrendering to the ensuing elusiveness, a heuristically neutral and all-encompassing definition is 
advisable. We can include under the concept of social Europe the following set of constitutive 
components: 
(1) The ensemble of social protection systems of the 28 (soon to be 27) member states, 
resting on the common, typically European traditions of a “social market economy” and 
“social dialogue”, but characterised by their different endowments of schemes and 
institutions, different logics and effectiveness in terms of market correcting, different loads 
of functional and distributive problems, different degrees of “stateness” (administrative 
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performance and capacity to resist social and political captures). We can define this 
component the National Social Spaces. 
(2) The novel membership space—coterminous with the EU external borders—inside which 
all the bearers of EU citizenship enjoy a common “title” bestowed upon them by the Union 
in order to access the benefits and services of the place in which they freely choose to settle 
and work, according to the rules of that place. Starting in the 1970s, the EU has put in place 
an articulated legal framework for the coordination of the social security systems of the 
member states, and since 2011 a directive regulates the cross-border mobility of patients. 
Let us define this component as the EU’s Mobility Space. 
(3) The ensemble of social schemes and policies characterised by a cross-border element—a 
grassroot development which took off in the 1990s and has increasingly gained momentum. 
Most of these initiatives involve regions, under the legal umbrella of European territorial 
cooperation (e.g. Euro-regions). Another interesting development on this front is the 
creation (mainly by the social partners) of cross-border occupational insurance schemes for 
pensions and health care benefits. This component may be called Transnational Social 
Spaces.  
(4) The ensemble of those supranational policies that have an explicit social purpose, be 
they of a regulative or (re)distributive nature, directly funded by the EU budget (if they 
imply spending) and based on either hard or soft law. This component is the EU Social 
Policy in its ordinary denotation. 
(5) The set of objectives and principles of a social nature contained in the Treaties , 
including those that allocate responsibilities between levels of government and define 
decision-making procedures. Given the supremacy of EU law over national law, such 
objectives and rules constitute the general framework that guides and constrains the other 
four components. We can call this component, broadly, the European Social Constitution. 
If this descriptive characterisation is accepted, then how can the five components be made to work 
in synch, with mutual reinforcements but also without generating negative externalities for EMU?  
There exists the need to devise an overall framework, for which one could adopt the term European 
Social Union (ESU), first proposed by Vandenbroucke (2015). The choice of words immediately 
evokes a system of separate but interdependent elements, subject (as in the European Monetary 
Union) to common rules and principles and aimed at sustaining/promoting two types of solidarity: a 
pan-European solidarity between countries and between individual EU citizens centred on 
supranational institutions (l’Europe dans le sociale) and the more traditional forms of national 
solidarity, centred on domestic institutions (le sociale dans l’Europe). The former should limit itself 
to pursuing redistributive goals which are functionally necessary and practically feasible. The 
latter’s goal is the highest possible degree of solidarity—taking into account the preferences 
expressed democratically by the voters. Concretely, the institutional mission of ESU should be to 
guide and support the functioning and modernisation of national welfare states based on some 
common standards and shared objectives, leaving to the member states wide margins of autonomy 
in the choice of ways and means. 
What could the ESU’s agenda be, with reference to the five components identified above? Let us 
briefly survey the major strategic priorities. 
National Social Spaces. Here, as is well known, the current European landscape is characterised by 
marked national variations resulting from long term policy trajectories, driven by distinct socio-
economic and cultural-political factors. To the extent that they mirror national preferences and 
traditions, domestic diversities in the organisation of solidarity are undoubtedly “legitimate” 
(Scharpf 2002). Some authors argue that the EU should stay aloof from harmonization or even any 
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promotion of upward convergence among systems; it should rather limit itself to “ordering” (in the 
German sense of Ordnungspolitik) institutional competition (Abelhauser 2014). A number of 
factors militate, however, in favour of a more proactive role for the Union. First, national social 
spaces are now confronting an increasing host of similar problems, in the wake of the rapid 
endogenous and exogenous transformations illustrated in the previous sections. A joint search for 
viable and effective solutions can broaden the horizons of national models and provide them with 
richer and wider policy options. Second, given the weight of policy lock-ins and path dependencies, 
institutional re-adaptation is a demanding task, even among good performers. The EU can help by 
supplying resources and incentives for overcoming organisational stickiness and political blockages 
to reform. Third, unbridled system competition based on the logic of (social) comparative 
advantages may lead to suboptimal and inefficient mutual adjustments, generating a growing 
“dualisation” between core and periphery (Palier and Rovny 2014) and hindering the formation of 
that pan-European solidarity which is at the same time a key normative element of the integration 
project and a necessary political condition for its success.  
The EU can and should be particularly proactive on one front: promoting a reorientation of national 
spaces towards social investment. As argued by a rich literature, social investments (and in 
particular the enhancement of human capital) are a real “policy imperative” if Europe as a whole 
wishes to reconcile economic competiveness and high prosperity/wellbeing in the context of 
increasing globalisation (Hemerijk 2013). Responding to such imperative is however an extremely 
difficult exercise, precisely because of the narrow horizons, institutional constraints and the 
political short-termism that characterise domestic systems (Ferrera2016a). In the last years the EU 
has elaborated an articulated agenda on desirable policy responses, underpinned by convincing 
functional (and partly normative) justifications. But more can and needs to be done: the facilitation 
of social investment should become a key political function of the European Social Union in the 
years to come (Ferrera 2016a). 
Mobility Space. Here the priority should be the correct regulation and management of the free 
movement of persons and their access to social benefits and services in the countries of destination. 
The ESU could not exist as a union of welfare states if it did not rest on a common underlying space 
which guarantees the right to basic social rights in any national system as a result of “entries” and 
“exits”. But as we know this issue has become increasingly contentious after the Eastern 
enlargement (Copeland 2012). In the mid-2000s, the image of the “Polish plumber” came to 
emblematically represent the challenge of reconciliation (at the practical, but also epistemic and 
normative level) between the logic of closure and the logic of opening. A similar controversy on 
free movement between member states has more recently arisen around the so-called “benefit 
tourism,” i.e. the (supposed) opportunistic migration of job seekers and inactive persons from low-
welfare to high-welfare member states (Ferrera 2016b). Again, without an adequate regulatory 
framework and normative framing, such type of tension is likely to escalate into a fully-fledged 
political conflict with disintegrative implications: Brexit docet. The current massive wave of 
migrants from outside the EU does not have much to do with the space of EU citizenship, but it is 
clear that the refugee crisis has made immigration in general an increasingly hot political theme, 
with negative consequences also for the more specific issues linked to intra-EU mobility. The 
existing Treaties are very clear: freedom of movement of workers is a core principle of the 
European construction. To change the rules would require a treaty change, an option fraught with 
risks in the current situation. But at the “constitutional” level the rules are very broad. Indeed, the 
free movement of workers/persons, and especially the access to social benefits are regulated by 
secondary legislation and Court jurisprudence (Giubboni 2016). It is at this level that solutions must 
be sought. More concretely, what might be done is a more stringent definition of the rights of those 
who do not work: e.g. the relatives who remain in the countries of origin (for example with regard 
to family allowances), residents who are not economically active, and to some extent also those 
who move in search of work. Partly, this can be done by applying more severely the restrictive 
clauses that already exist. But one can also imagine to introduce legislative changes through the 
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ordinary procedure. It is clear that the freedom of movement of workers and their entitlement to 
social security benefits should remain a “red line” not to be crossed. On other types of intra-EU 
migrants, however, it is reasonable to recognise that the pan-European solidarity now politically 
viable is more limited than that provided for by the regulatory status quo. As long as the “red line” 
(the minimum level of solidarity which is necessary to speak of a EU common space) is respected, 
it would not be unreasonable to give back to the member states a modicum of autonomy in filtering 
the access to social benefits on the part of non-national inactive or non-resident persons. A 
redirection in this sense is already detectable in recent European Court of Justice rulings and 
doctrine (De Witte 2015).  
Transnational Social Spaces. Over the last twenty years, the sub-national level has significantly 
increased its role and importance in many areas of social protection: from health to social services, 
from active labour market policies to inclusion policies. This trend toward a social neo-regionalism 
is partly connected to European integration, which has gradually relaxed the regulative “security 
belts” around nation states and provided incentives and resources for processes of region building, 
largely focused on the territorial differentiation of welfare policies. Ever since Jacques Delors, a 
deliberate European strategy has been emerging (mainly supported by the Commission) to 
strengthen the “third level” of government, increase the involvement of the latter in social policy, 
and encourage cross-border experimentation (Wassenberg and Reitel 2015). These novel 
aggregations can promote interesting forms of coordination and even fusion of social 
infrastructures, feed new forms of cross-border solidarity—intermediate between infra-national and 
pan-European solidarity. A similar virtuous circle can result from a second ongoing trend of “social 
transnationalisation”, i.e. the creation of cross-border pension schemes providing supplementary 
benefits to employees working in different member states (Guardiancich and Natali 2012). Made 
possible by a 2003 Directive (entered into force in 2005), the establishment of such institutions 
works towards a de-territorialisation of solidarity by encouraging risk sharing along functional and 
corporate lines. The role of all these developments for the consolidation of ESU should not be 
underestimated also in political terms. By directly connecting the supranational and the sub-national 
level/elites, on the one hand, and by stimulating social partner activism and involvement, such 
processes open up new channels and new ways of bonding and more generally legitimate the EU as 
a whole. 
EU Social Policy. Here the debate is already very extensive and the agenda is crowded—even if 
relatively unproductive so far. An incomplete inventory should include at least the following 
issues/objectives: 
(1) The introduction of common standards for labour market, wage setting and social inclusion, 
in order to combat social dumping and facilitate mobility. 
(2) A better use and an increase of the EU’s resources for (co-)financing reforms and especially 
social investment. 
(3) Significantly widening the scope of action of the European Fund for Strategic Investment 
from physical to social infrastructures and policies. 
(4) Strengthening cooperation and if possible establishing standards in the field of education, 
including early childhood education and care. 
(5) Strengthening the European social dialogue. 
(6) Improving social governance arrangements within the European Semester. 
(7) Specifically including modernising social reforms in the list of conditions for obtaining 
“flexibility” in national budgets.  
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Within ESU, the big strategic priority of EU social policy (i.e. the component anchored directly to 
the supranational level) should be to give a sharper profile and traction to pan-European forms of 
solidarity, calibrating both “reciprocity” and “benevolence” criteria (Ferrera 2016b).    
The most effective tool for re-organising social reciprocity between the member states is some form 
of risk-pooling. The Five President’s Report has already outlined a mutualisation agenda in the 
banking sector (e.g. through a common deposit guarantee by means of a reinsurance system 
[Juncker 2015]). But a more visible and effective innovation would be the establishment of a EU 
shock absorber scheme to co-finance unemployment benefits. One of the clearest summaries of this 
proposal was outlined by the so-called Glieniker Group (a number of prominent German academics 
and public intellectuals):  
a euro-area insurance mechanism to cushion the fiscal consequences of a dramatic economic 
downturn. The euro-area could therefore establish a common unemployment insurance system, to 
complement national systems: all countries that organise their labour market in line with the needs of 
the monetary union could be eligible for participation. They would create a mechanism to counteract 
deep recessions with automatic shock stabilisers. Thus the macro-economic cohesion of the euro-
area could be strengthened and the integration of the European labour market accelerated (Glieniker 
Gruppe2013).  
The discussion on such a scheme is already fairly advanced, also from a technical point of view. 
Retrospective calculations of the spending flows of this scheme—had it been in place since the 
adoption of the common currency—show that virtually all countries of the Eurozone would have 
received something—including Germany (Claeys et al. 2014). Another promising proposal on the 
risk-pooling front is that of promoting the formation of single, pan-European pension insurance 
schemes at the industry or sectoral level, on the initiative of the social partners (Briganti 2015). 
As to benevolence-based solidarity, the most obvious instrument would be a EU scheme of last 
resort assistance. As mentioned above, the standard in this case should be “sufficientarian”: making 
sure that all EU citizens have “enough”, at least enough to survive. Ever since the 1992 
Recommendation on sufficient resources, the Commission has been sensitive to this issue and 
efforts are now being made to identify “reference budgets”, i.e. indicators of absolute poverty 
(Storms et al. 2014). In terms of policy action, there is a legacy that stretches back to the late 1980s, 
when the European food aid program for the most deprived persons (MDP) was launched by Delors 
in order to redistribute agricultural surpluses. In the wake of the crisis, a new scheme was officially 
created in 2014, called Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), with a focus on 
severe material deprivation (Madama 2016). Compared to pre-existing schemes, the FEAD is more 
ambitious as it envisages: a) the move from the sphere of agricultural policy to social policy; b) the 
widening of the scope of the intervention (from food aid to the fight of material poverty and social 
exclusion); c) an increase of resources (taking into account national co-financing); d) the shift from 
voluntary to compulsory participation for EU member states; e) a novel multi-level and multi-actor 
governance architecture. FEAD is part of a wider strategy centred on the European Strategic 
Investment Funds (ESIF). This strategy offers the most promising grounds for enhancing 
benevolence-based solidarity anchored directly to the EU. The mission of this type of solidarity 
should be to establish a safety net below reciprocity. To quote the Glieniker Group again,  
The responsibility of member states entails the responsibility of their taxpayers. It is therefore 
inevitable that [national] taxpayers will have to shoulder a large share of the burdens of the crisis and 
suffer painful reforms. But the limit of responsibility ends where livelihoods are threatened. If in 
Greece, Portugal or Spain a whole generation is deprived of their chance to live a productive life, it 
is not just a Greek, Portuguese, or Spanish problem, but one that affects us all citizens of the EU 
(Glieniker Gruppe 2013). 
It will not be easy to make substantial and rapid progress on the front of pan-European solidarity.  
On the one hand, there are obvious dangers of moral hazard (and thus the need to reduce risks prior 
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to establishing new schemes—though it is not clear precisely what such reduction should entail). 
On the other, there is the imperative of upholding the livelihood of the least advantaged, wherever 
they reside. Although the technical and political obstacles are remarkable, this is possibly the most 
urgent “nut to crack” for triggering off an orderly and reasonable Europeanisation of solidarity. 
European Social Constitution. This component is perhaps the least visible to the general public but 
it certainly is the most important one. The Lisbon Treaty has already dug the foundation of the ESU 
in terms of objectives and, in part, instruments (Bruun et al. 2012). Among the most important 
innovations are, among others, the redefinition of the programmatic values and objectives of the 
Union, the explicit acknowledgement of the links between the internal market and the achievement 
of full employment and social progress, the formal recognition of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, and—last but not least—the introduction of a transversal “social clause”. The crisis has 
severely weakened the transformative potential of such constitutional changes. Not only have the 
new rules introduced by the Six Pack, Two Pack and the Fiscal Compact strengthened the paradigm 
of austerity and of a “disciplinarian” mode of governance but, according to some commentators, 
such changes are not legally in line with the general provisions of the Treaty concerning, precisely, 
the social sphere (Kocharov 2012). 
The agenda of the European social constitution must therefore re-start from Lisbon, enabling the 
full potential of its principles and provisions. The most promising springboard seems to be the 
social clause (Article 9 TFEU), according to which 
in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account 
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, guarantee of adequate social 
protection, the fight against social exclusion and a high level of education, training and protection of 
human health. 
If properly operationalised, the activation of this clause might have significant  effects in terms of 
the balance between the economic and social dimension. It could in fact serve as a barrier against 
undue encroachments of the market logic in domestic solidarity spaces. And it could act as a tool to 
monitor and facilitate the effective implementation of the ambitious social objectives set out in Art. 
3 TEU. Mutatis mutandis, its effectsould be similar to those originated by the clause on gender 
mainstreaming (i.e. the integration of gender equality in all EU policies) introduced in the 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam (Vieille 2012).  
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 summarise the priorities of the ESU agenda and the types of solidarity which 
underpin each of its components. 
 
 FIGURE 2.9 HERE 
FIGURE 2.10 HERE 
 
Figure 2.11 offers in turn a visualisation of the overall architecture of the European Social Union. 
How could such a framework be actualised? The most ambitious strategy would be the explicit 
mention and establishment of a European Social Union in the Treaties, as a counterpart of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (through the addition of a short article similar to art. 3 TEU, 
paragraph 4: “The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the 
euro”). Such step may be ultimately unnecessary and it would be certainly premature at this stage. 
But nothing prevents the starting of a strategic reflection on the topic. The EMU was born after a 
long gestation period, and its formal conception occurred in 1988, when the European Council 
entrusted to Jacque Delors the task of developing a concrete project. A similar initiative on the 
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social front could serve today not only as an analytical and technical clarification, but also as a 
precious source of political legitimation.  
FIGURE 2.11 HERE 
 
2.4 Enhancing EU citizens’ rights  
A suitable and partly “transversal” foundation for expanding and making ESU more visible in the 
eyes of national public opinions (especially as regards the EU mobility space and EU social policy)  
is the instrument of EU citizenship. Introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, EU citizenship is  
derivative from national citizenship. In the social sphere, it basically entitles its holders to be treated 
as equals when they enter the citizenship space of another member state. The rights attached to the 
EU passport only apply when one crosses an internal border. True, the EU has adopted a Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and has recently launched a new initiative called the European Pillar of Social 
Rights. But these are rather soft rights, they apply only in respect of EU legislative acts and do not 
really add anything substantial to the catalogue of rights already existing in the member states.  
EU citizenship does not confer subjective entitlements to material protections (transfers or services) 
directly provided by the EU. The limited supranational funds that exist in the social field (e.g. the 
European Social Fund) can only be accessed by national or regional governments. When 
supranational regulatory measures are adopted (e.g. on gender equality or employment protection) 
they need to be transposed into national legislation to become operative. Even if they concern 
individual cases, jurisdictional decisions (the rulings of the ECJ) can only result from a request on 
the side of a national Court.  
Like all rights, also derivative ones have corresponding duties. In the first place, mobile citizens are 
subject to the same obligations that are in force in the country of destination: in particular, they 
must pay taxes and social security contributions. But the EU derivative social rights generate a 
second, and less visible, type of duty. Stay-at-home citizens are obliged to “make room” for the 
mobiles, share with them their own national space (an identity-thick and rights-thick space) and 
bear the burdens of “hospitality”. Empirical studies demonstrate that intra-EU mobility is not driven 
by benefit tourism and that, in the aggregate, it tends to benefit the receiving member states. But at 
the disaggregate level (this or that territorial area, this or that economic sector, this or that policy 
field) the negative economic and social externalities produced by the mobiles may be greater than 
the positive ones. The influx of citizens from other EU member states may in fact decrease the 
availability of scarce resources such as jobs, hospital beds, emergency care, social housing, school 
places and so on.  
Contrary to what happens at the domestic level, the social component of EU citizenship rests on 
regulation, not on allocation (i.e. material provisions directly funded through tax extractions on the 
side of the conferring authority). This strategy has caused significant political asymmetries: as a 
matter of fact, it has empowered a relatively small constituency of mobile citizens, at the 
(perceived) expense of large majorities of non-mobile natives. In the medium and large EU 
countries, more than half of the natives have always lived in the region where they were born and 
hardly expect to exercise their rights of free movement. On average, large majorities of nationals 
have never visited another EU country, watched TV or read a book in another language, used the 
internet to purchase goods from abroad. It is not surprising that many of these people perceive the 
rights of immigrants as a loss in the value of their own rights and opportunities within their 
communities. Such perceptions are stronger among the less educated and within poorer areas, where 
vulnerability is higher and immigration is seen as a threat in the competition for scarce resources. 
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As a result of these dynamics, the introduction of EU citizenship has not met its integrative and 
bonding promises. Quite to the contrary, it has provoked a sort of boomerang effect. As aptly put by 
Luuk Van Middelaar (2013, 261), “[t]he goal was: Hurrah, ‘we Europeans’ can work in twenty-
seven countries! The public response has in fact been: Polish plumbers are coming to take ‘our 
jobs’ and Brussels is to blame!” 
Is there a way to remedy this failure, with a view to leveraging on EU citizenship in order to move 
towards a fully-fledged ESU? If the diagnosis is correct, any remedial strategy must address two 
distinct challenges: 1) deactivating the current vicious disintegrative circle;  2) making the 
rebalanced container of EU citizenship more visible and its content more substantial. 
Deactivating the vicious circle. The rebalancing of the current system can be achieved in two 
complementary ways: a partial compensation for the negative externalities produced by free movers 
and some forms of empowerment of those who do not exercise free movement rights. The 
establishment of something like a EU Fund to ease the impact of mobility (or immigration more 
generally) could serve the purpose. It could work through national (better: sub-national) 
applications and selection criteria based on adequate evidence of impact. The UK government 
experimented with a similar fund at the national level, which was established in 2008 by the Brown 
government and later (rather inconsiderately) scrapped by the Cameron government in 2010. 
According to the REScEU survey, the creation of such a pan-European scheme would be highly 
welcomed by EU citizens (see Figure 2.12). 
 
Figure 2.12 here 
 
Empowering the stayers could be a second promising step. At the moment, the EU not only guards 
and regulates free movement (including in its social dimension), but provides a range of incentives 
and instrumental resources to encourage intra-EU mobility. One option would be to consider 
putting in place a scheme creating some stake for stay-at-homes as well in the area of free 
movement. Instead of limiting itself to easing the impact of migrants in the receiving communities, 
the above-mentioned EU fund (e.g. redefined as EU Mobility Fund) could offer, upon application, 
Universal Transferable Vouchers (or drawing rights) that family members could pass to their 
kin—in particular sons and daughters wishing to move. Such vouchers (each having a certain value) 
could be used to access the existing benefits and services aimed for mobile workers. Everyone 
would be entitled to a voucher, but the transferability rule could endow some movers with more 
value. One might also consider to allow using vouchers for participating in lifelong learning 
activities at home (and/or in other member states, for short periods) on the part of workers who do 
not wish to exercise their right of free movement. This rule would increase the stakes of stay-at-
homes. It is to be noted that EU facilitating schemes in the area of childcare, education, training, 
lifelong learning can be justified not only on the basis of free movement, but also of the mere fact 
of economic and monetary unification. 
A third possibility would be to establish a brand new Supranational Scheme for Insuring Mobile 
Workers against some risks (unemployment, maternity, disability etc.): a sort of 29th scheme (or 
28th, after Brexit) separate from existing national schemes and providing homogeneous protections 
to those workers who move across borders. This idea has been circulating in the debate ever since 
the 1970s, when the social security coordination regime was adopted. As shown by Figure 2.13, 
popular support for the establishment of such a scheme would be very high. One of its advantages 
would be to ease the financial pressure (real or perceived) on domestic social protection systems 
stemming from the inflow of mobile workers and their families. 
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Figure 2.13 here 
 
Making EU citizenship more visible and salient. In addition to the binding supranational 
regulations that force the opening up of national spaces, the EU has sponsored, organised, and 
funded a number of facilitating initiatives with a view to easing and supporting cross-border 
mobility and transactions (e.g. the European network of employment services [EURES], Erasmus, 
the European health insurance card, e-health, quick assistance services to travelling citizens—
including a EU-wide emergency number, 112—a support service for crime victims and so on). A 
number of additional initiatives are planned for the future, such as a single digital gateway to 
receive counsel and assistance in cross-border situations or a common EU disability card.  
While it is true that all these facilitating initiatives provide tangible benefits only if there is a cross-
border element, their personal scope is potentially very wide: it goes well beyond the constituency 
of mobile workers, affecting travellers and tourists, patients, students, consumers. Among ordinary 
people there is only very limited awareness of these initiatives. One could imagine the introduction 
of a EU Social Card (with a number identifier) available to all European citizens to enhance the 
visibility of (and also easing access to) the various privileges and services already provided by these 
initiatives. In the US the social security number is not only a pre-requisite for most contacts with 
the public administration, but also a visible and tangible symbol of membership to the US legal 
space. Italy has a similar “number”, which is called codice fiscale, requested for any application to a 
public benefit, in addition to being used for tax purposes. This number used to be shown on a 
dedicated plastic card, identifying each citizen (and legal residents) primarily as a taxpayer. The 
number is now shown on a different card: the tessera sanitaria—used to access the National Health 
Service—which evokes the idea of an entitlement associated to tax duties. A smart move in terms of 
integration and bonding.  
The salience of EU citizenship could be enhanced also by strengthening the existing social funds 
and creating new ones. These include the Globalization Adjustment Fund, providing resources to 
workers affected by plant restructuring or closure, and the Fund for European Aid to Deprived 
Persons, providing resources in case of extreme poverty. Benefits are not paid directly to recipients, 
but through local authorities—which must previously apply for assistance. The indirect character 
and the small budget of these funds greatly limit their public visibility and salience. As a minimum, 
the EU should seek some credit by prescribing to local authorities to clearly indicate the provenance 
of resources at the endpoints of the delivery chain. If a “EU social card” were in place, it could 
provide a tangible instrument for linking benefit fruition and EU citizenship.  
 
Figure 2.14 here 
 
In the wake of a proposal of the Italian government during its last EU presidency (following 
preparatory work by the Commission), the establishment of a EU fund to compensate cyclical 
unemployment (already mentioned in the previous section) is currently on the EU agenda. This 
would be a major step in terms of pan-European solidarity—possibly one of the first important 
building blocks of a future European Social Union. Most likely, this fund will also operate 
indirectly. Given its wide personal scope, it will be extremely important to render the link between 
the EU and the resources accruing to national authorities and, ultimately, citizens as clear and 
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evident as possible. Survey data shows that popular support for such an initiative is very large (see 
Figure 2.14). Table 1 summarises the set of proposals made in this section. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Conclusion 
According to Rodrick’s famous “trilemma”,  globalisation has made it increasingly difficult if not 
outright impossible to reconcile democracy, sovereignty, and economic opening. There can be 
democratic politics within sovereign nation states only if we restrain opening (as was the case 
during the European Trentes Glorieuses). We can have sovereignty and economic opening, but 
without the constraints of democratic institutions (the Chinese model?). We might give up 
sovereignty and create a global democracy aligned with a globalised economy (a modernised 
version of the Kantian utopia). But for the time being the obstacles to this third scenario seem 
insurmountable.  
In Rodrik’s view (shared by many other scholars), the trilemma holds also within the Europe. 
However, European integration has the potential to overcome the trilemma. National sovereignties 
have already fused together  in many key areas, empowering supranational institutions (including 
the ECJ) as a novel common sovereign representing de iure both the member states and EU citizens 
individually. Economic opening has gone a very long way, but it has not killed domestic democratic 
institutions. The fact is that the EU member states are not simply democracies, they are welfare 
democracies, or democratic welfare states. The challenge today is how to reconcile economic 
opening with social protection. In our view, this requires the establishment of a democratic (or even 
better: a demoicratic) European Social Union, along the lines sketched above. The challenge is 
substantial, not only from an institutional perspective, but also, and especially, from a political 
perspective. The c survey shows that a “silent majority” of citizens might be available to support 
such a farsighted agenda. However, the need for brave and responsible political actors capable to 
connect this potential majority with an ambitious vision remains. Who might those actors be? As of 
now, unfortunately, there is no one in sight. 
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More European solidarity than meets the eye 
Ten messages from the REScEU mass survey (Fall 2016)1 
The EU is doomed to fail. That is what we hear more and more often in public debates. Weakened by 
the economic crisis and austerity policies, the European public opinion now refuses to give carte 
blanche to governments that look for further market integration, a stronger monetary union and 
more powers to Brussels. The recent comeback of souverainiste temptations is only the tip of a wider 
Eurosceptic iceberg - we hear - that is opposed to any prospect of further integration and that calls 
for the end of the Euro. Lucky enough if we will be able to deal with all that without incurring in 
major disruptions.  
Although popular, this analysis is too simplistic and dismissive. Can we really say that Europeans 
deeply dislike the Eu? Or is there a chance that a pro-European majority is silently hiding under the 
Eurosceptic blankets? A recent poll conducted in 7 European countries (www.resceu.eu) points 
exactly into this direction. In other words, if we look at empirical data, there is no such thing as a 
major Eurosceptic iceberg below the water. Quite to the contrary, the survey reveals a much less 
gloomy picture than commonly thought.  
This flash note reports the main results of the survey and the ten messages that can be drawn from 
them.  Public opinion polls need to be taken with a grain of salt. Yet, the general indication  is clear: a 
majority of citizens living in core EU member states still believes in the EU. How is it possible then 
that Eurosceptic minorities make the headlines all over the Continent in public debates? Why have 
the solidaristic attitudes revealed by the survey been ignored over the past years of crisis 
management? To make the point clear: data show that even a majority of German citizens back EU 
wide solidarity mechanisms. 
European leaders should care about these results. If there is anything missing in European politics, it 
is not a pro-European electoral and social bedrock, but political leaders that are able to give a voice 
to this silent majority. The political groups that have driven the process of European integration until 
now (liberals, Christian democrats and social democrats) are in front of a historical failure. If the EU is 
on the brink of collapse, it is simply because its élites are unable to suggest an alternative to 
“souverainisme”, on one hand,  and fiscal austerity, on the other. An alternative capable of 
reassuring worried voters that the EU does have a "caring" face and that it is not a threat for jobs, 
democracy and national cultures. If there is any deficit in this Union, it comes in the form of a lack of 
ideas, initiatives, and assumption of historic responsibility by the political class. If things do not 
rapidly change, we all shall pay dear for it, condemning our sons and daughters to live in a divided 
and impoverished Europe, with little or no influence at all on the global stage.  
Maurizio Ferrera 
                                                          
1
 Resceu (Reconciling Economic and Social Europe) is a research project funded by an Advanced Grant of the European 
Research Council (ERC, grant no. 340534), directed by Maurizio Ferrera. It is based at the University of Milan and at the 
Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione Luigi Einaudi.  
Websites: www.resceu.eu; www.euvisions.eu  
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Reconciling Economic and Social Europe? Ten positive messages 
 
1. Voters believe the EU should be more social. A majority of respondents (61%) think the top 
priority for the EU should be ensuring social protection, whereas 39% of voters are in favor of 
ensuring fiscal stability and competitiveness. 
2. During a financial crisis, despite a slight plurality of voters (36,5%) supports the current 
“conditionality regime”, there is a large share of respondents (35%) who would support more cross-
national solidarity. 
3. The support for open labor markets remains high (49,2%), even if a sizeable share of voters 
(20,2%) would like to make mobility conditional on an employment contract. 
4. The vast majority of voters supports the access of non-nationals to domestic welfare benefits 
(81,4%). Among those, a sizeable share would reserve this right only to EU nationals (38,5%). In 
addition, a vast majority (65,7%) is in favor of shifting decisions on immigration to the EU level. 
5. Vast majorities (75,9%) would welcome EU funded schemes for economic and social investments, 
the fight against severe poverty (75,6%), insuring mobile workers (67,7%), helping member states to 
face sudden rises of unemployment (77,7%). Finally, 71,2% of respondents are in favour of a 
common EU fund compensating national governments and local communities for the costs related 
to extra-EU immigration. 
6. A majority of voters has a positive image of the EU as a “neighborhood community”, i.e. as a 
shared home (23,8%) or apartment building (30,1%), whereas 25,8% of voters consider the EU as 
just a playground for economic exchanges and a minority (20,3%) sees the EU as a sinking ship. 
7.  In a referendum on EU membership the exit option would be rejected by the majority of voters 
Germany (75%), France (57%), Italy (63%), Poland (72%), Spain (74%) and Sweden (57%). 
8. In case of a new Brexit referendum,  the majority of UK voters would choose to remain in the EU 
(53%) (November 2016). 
9. The majority of British voters (51%) would favor a new trade agreement with the EU even if it 
implied accepting free movement of workers, whereas 36,9% would welcome a new free trade 
agreement only without EU immigration. Only a small minority (12,1%) would be against a free trade 
agreement (November 2016). 
10.  Substantial majorities of voters remain worried about European integration causing loss of jobs 
(64,5%), loss of national identity (52,8%) and weakening of national democracy (60,3%). 
 
To download the results of the survey visit: 
www.resceu.eu 
  
Figure 1.1: World manufacturing shares, 1970-2010 
Source: Baldwin (2016) 
 
Figure 1.2: The G7 countries’ share of the world GDP, 1820-2014 




Figure 1.3: Real per capita income gains by income level, 1988-2008 





Figure 1.4: The Great Gatsby curve 
 






Figure 1.5: Social fluidity in Europe 
 
 





Figure 1.6: Per capita GDP at current market prices - selected countries, 2000-16 (EU15 = 100). 
 
 







































Figure 1.12:  Effective tax rates on corporate income - selected countries, 1974-2000 
Source: Razin et al. (2005) 
 
Figure 1.13: Government debt as a percentage of GDP - EU members, 2016 




Figure 1.14: Poverty risk by age groups - EU member states, 2008 and 2014 
 
Source: European Parliament (March 2016) 
 
 














Figure 1.17: Opinion on globalisation - selected countries, October 2016 
Source: YouGov  
 
  
Figure 1.18: Opinion on globalisation and GDP variation - selected countries, 2011-15 




Figure 1.19: Opinion on immigration - selected countries, October 2016 
Source: YouGov 
 








Figure 1.21: European Parliamentary groups, 2009 and 2014 





Figure 2.1:  GDP growth forecast - EU member states, Spring 2017 
 
Source: Adapted from European Commission (Spring 2017) 
  




Figure 2.3: Dominant images of the European Union, Fall 2016 
Source: Pellegata and Ferrera (2017) 
  
Figure 2.4: Opinion on interstate solidarity in the EU - selected countries, Fall 2016 




Figure 2.5: Opinion on the EU’s provision of means of subsistence - selected countries, Fall 2016 
Source: REScEU and EuVisions 
 
Figure 2.6: Opinion on the EU’s provision of poverty relief - selected countries, Fall 2016 
Source: REScEU and EuVisions 
  
Figure 2.7: Opinion on the EU’s provision of unemployment insurance - selected countries, Fall 2016 
 
Source: REScEU and EuVisions 
 
Figure 2.8: Opinion on the provision of welfare to EU immigrants - selected countries, Fall 2016 
Source: REScEU 
  
Figure 2.9: Types of solidarity within ESU 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
Figure 2.10: ESU priorities  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
  































In favour of a common EU fund compensating national 










Figure 2.14 Pan-European solidarity: EU measures against unemployment 
   
 Financial help to states that face a rise in unemployment 
   
 Disagree Agree 
   
France 32,1 67,9 
Germany 35,1 64,9 
Italy 8,8 91,2 
Poland 18,1 82,0 
Spain 9,0 91,0 
Sweden 30,5 69,5 
   
EU6 22,3 77,7 






















In favour of a common EU social insurance scheme that 






Table 1: Adding a social component to EU citizenship 
Compensating the stayers: 
- EU Fund to ease the impact of mobility 
 
Enabling the stayers: 
- A system of (transferable) universal vouchers for mobility/upskilling purposes  
 
Autonomising the movers: 
- EU social insurance scheme for mobile workers 
 
Universal empowerment and protection 
- A social card for access to the whole range of EU funded facilitating services 
- Enhancing the visibility and salience of the Global Adjustment Fund, the Fund for European 
Aid to the Most Deprived Persons (FEAD) and of the various initiatives of the European Social 
Fund 
- A EU Fund against cyclical unemployment 
- A EU insurance against the victims of terrorism and persons injured in the line of duty 
- Enhancing and making more visible the external protections linked to the EU passport 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
